WELLS vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of New York, General Term, .3f1arch, 1858.
PHILLIP C. WELLS vs. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COIPANY.
1 Where the plaintiff was a free passenger on a railroad train, under a special contract with the carrier that the latter should not be liable to any damages arising
from negligence, and was injured by a collision, it was held, that the contract was
valid, and that the plaintiff could not recover unless he could show that the negligence was fraudulent, willful or reckless.
2. Signification of the word "1negligence" in this contract.

The plaintiff was the holder of a free ticket issued by the defendants, which entitled him to a passage in the defendants' cars
at his own pleasure. Upon this ticket was the endorsement quoted
in the opinion, as constituting the contract between the parties.
The plaintiff at the trial proved the collision, and the verdict was
for the plaintiff under the direction of the circuit judge who tried
the cause.
F7. -E. Cornwell, for plaintiff.
B. H. Avery, for defendant.
The opinion of the Supreme court was delivered by
SmITH, J.-Tn the conclusion of the judge at the circuit, that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, I find myself unable to
concur. The plaintiff received a free ticket from the defendants
entitling him or permitting him to ride in their cars at his own pleasure, with an endorsement on his ticket by which "'he expressly
agreed that the Company should not be liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence by their agents or otherwise, for any
injury to his person or for any loss or injury to his property."
These were the terms and conditions on which the defendants
gave, and the plaintiff received, his ticket. It implies in effect an
agreement on the part of the plaintiff to take the risk of all the
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casualties attending railroad travel so far as they arose, or might
arise, or result from negligence on the part of the officers and agents
of the defendants. The defendants are a corporation engaged in
carrying persons and property as common carriers. They are
necessarily obliged to carry on their business through the instrumentality of numerous officers and other agents. From the character of the business, the great liability to accidents or injuries to persons and property resulting more or less in most cases from some
degree of neglect or want of care on the part of some of their numerous employees, and the serious character of such injuries, the Company might well desire to restrict their liability to damages from
such casualties to the narrowest possible limit. In respect to persons carried for hire, they could obviously impose no restrictions
that should excuse them from the exercise of the utmost diligence
and care.
But they are not obliged to carry any person, without compensation, at their own risk. They must have a clear right to contract
with any such person that he must take his own risk. He would
ride in the same cars with other passengers and would be liable to
the same and no greater accidents; but as he paid nothing for his
fare he might well agree to take his own risk. He knew that the
Company was liable to suffer great loss and damage from tha negligence of its agents, and that it would naturally seek to avoid and
had a great interest in preventing such loss by every reasonable
precaution.
But with the best of care and the utmost caution, some accidents
he knew would unavoidably occur from the unforeseen negligence,
carelessness, or want of skill of its employees. Against all such
accidents, ",under any circumstances, whether of negligence by the
agents of the defendants, or otherwise, the plaintiff expressly agreed
to assume and take his own risk." This is the bargain. It is not
unlawful. It is distinctly and fairly made and clearly understood.
I cannot see why it is not fully binding to the extent of exempting
the defendants from all loss or liability to loss or damage from
injuries resulting from mere negligence. I do not see any ground
to stop short of this exemption from loss or liability on the part of

WELLS vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

715

the defendants within the entire range or scope of negligence, not
arising from bad faith or fraud.
I see no ground to measure the degrees of negligence. The contract makes no degrees. It is sweeping and includes all negligence.
It makes no exception of gross negligence. The plaintiff and defendant both knew that there was a liability to accidents from gross as
well as from slight negligence. They use the word negligence, in
its general legal sense, to embrace all accidents or injuries resulting
from carelessness, or mere nonfeasance, of the defendant's agents.
Nothing else, it seems to me, will satisfy the fair meaning, the
plain import of the contract. The plaintiff's injury resulted from a
collision betwen the cars of the train in which he was riding as passenger and some cars standing on the track. . It was of course a
case of negligence to have such a collision, but collisions do happen
quite frequently, and that was as well known to the plaintiff as to
all the public. This cause of injury was most obviously within the
contemplation of the parties, for it is the most fruitful cause of accidents and loss and injuries in railroad travelling. All collisions of
trains must be the result of negligence in some degree, perhaps in
the scale or degree of gross negligence. But with this ticket as his
title and authority to ride in the defendant's cars, and as the contract on which the defendants agreed to carry him, I think the defendants are not liable for any injuries except such as were the result
of fraudulent, willful, or reckless misconduct on the part of the defendant's officers or its agents. I put the exemption from liability from
injuries resulting from negligence entirely upon the terms of the
express agreement between the parties. If the plaintiff had been
riding at the time gratuitously upon simply a free ticket, or
upon invitation of defendants as matter of favor, courtesy, or otherwise, the defendants would be liable. The cases of -Philadelphia
and Reading Railroad Company vs. Derby, 14 Howard U. S. R.
and of Steamboat New World vs. King, 16 How. 477, Gillenwater vs. The Mliadison RB., 5 Indiana 339, fully established the
rule that the common law liability of a carrier applies in such cases
to all injuries resulting from negligence.
A common carrier for his hire, like other bailees for hire, may
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clearly limit his risk by express contract, although long doubted,
this is now distinctly settled. Dow vs. .New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, 1 Kernan, 490; Alexander vs. Green, 2 Hill 20, 7
Hill, 333, S. C; Wells & Tucker vs. The Steam _avigation Company, 4 Selden, 381; Parsons vs. Monteath, 13 Barbour' 360;
Moore vs. Evans, 14 Ib.524; Camden & Amboy B R.vs. Baldauf,
16 Penn. 67; Penn. RR. vs. M'Closkey, 23 Ib.526.
A carrier cannot contract for an exemption from losses arising
from his own personal fraud or gross negligence. Such a contract
would be contra bonos mores, and void. Parsons vs. Monteath;
Wells vs. Steam.Navigation Co., supra.
But in the last case, Judge Gardiner says :-" Although the law
will not suffer a man to claim immunity by contract against his own
fraud I know of no reason why this may not be done in reference
to fraud or felony committed by those in his employment." If this
be so, certainly.he may contract for exemption from loss arising
from the negligence of his servants and agents. This is the precise
distinction that I would make, and is the precise point upon which
I cannot agree with the decision at the circuit. But the judge at
the circuit put the liability of the defendants on the ground that
the collision which caused the injuries was prima facie gross negligence, and he held that the defendant could not stipulate for exemption from such neglect. The distinction between the several degrees
of negligence is too nice and too artificial for any clear definition
and practical application. As Judge Curtis, in 16 Howard, 477,
says, it may well be doubted if these terms can be usefully applied
in practice. Judge Story also remarks, Story on Bailments, § 99,
that the law furnishes no definition of the terms "gross negligence,"
or "ordinary negligence," which can be applied in practice, and
these distinctions are utterly repudiated by the late civil law writers.
But if by gross negligence the circuit judge means such neglect
as implies fraud or bad faith on the part of the defendants, I can
agree with him in his conclusions that for such negligence the defendants would be liable, but I do not think the evidence warrants
any such finding as matter of fact. A bailee who is only liable for
gross neglect is responsible only as a naked depository without
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reward, which is the first class of bailments as classified by Sir William Jones, Jones on Bailments, 86. This class of bailees he says,
page 46, "is only answerable for a fraud or for gross neglect, which
is considered evidence of it, and not for such ordinary inattention
as may be compatible with good faith." If this gross negligence
which is evidence of fraud, can be rebutted by evidence, that the
depository keeps his own goods of the same kind in a manner
equall ' negligent, then he is not liable, Edwards on Bailments, 69
and 70. It is enough that the bailee keep the property as his own.
Idem. 72; Fostervs. Esse a Bank, 17 Mass. 479.
It seems to me very clear that there is nothing in this case to
warrant the finding that the defendants were guilty of such gross
negligence as is equivalent to fraud or evidence of fraud. The
plaintiff was riding in a car of a train which carried also the servants of the defendants, whose lives were in the same jeopardy
with that of the plaintiff. A collision was likely to destroy much
property of the defendants, and cause much loss of life besides the
lives of their servants and agents, for which the company would be
liable in heavy losses. There is and can be nothing in such a case
upon which to base a charge of fraud, or bad faith- on the part of
the defendant's agents or officers. There was not such gross negligence as implies fraud or is evidence of it.
The defendants took the same care of the plaintiff that they did
of themselves, their property and a large number of passengers, for
whose safe passage they were bound to watch and guard with the
strictest degree of diligence and care. In such a case I cannot
think the defendants liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
and the judgment of special term ought to be reversed and a new
trial granted. Costs to abide the event. Judgment reversed.'
IConsult

Story on Bailm.

549 ; Angell on Carriers,

50, 220, 221; Chitty on

Carriers, p. 3, Am. ed., note, and cases there cited; Redfield on Railr., p. 269,

note, 274, 27.5, 276; Pierce on Railr. p. 420, 421, 468.

JAMES vs. RAILROAD' COMPANY LT AL.

-&7ite Superior C'ourt~of(fiainnati,Special Term, 1858.
JOSEPHA. 44dRS vs. CINCINNATI, HABIILTON AND DAYTON RAILOAD
CoMPANY ET AL.
.ynerc

sunsc ptions -L sock are made,.to be plaid in instalmenats, and certificates

of stock are to-be issued f16the several instdlments, 6 readin dnd willingness
to issue the certificates at the time iayment is to lie made, is ,al that can: be
required.
2. In an action to recover money agreed to be, pai, for the stock, an averment of a
readiness and willingness to issue and deliver the certificates of stock is necessary.

The right to enforde payment is not distinct and independent from the
If the subscriber cannot get the stock, the

alility to issue and deliver the stock.

p~ynent of mney gannot be enforced.
,as .contemporaneous.

The acts to be done must be regaided

3. When a'party, having the abifity to perxmrn an executory contrac, on his part,
assigns his interest in such contract, he must be considered as equitably bound
"Io perform it, so as to give the befiefit of it to the assignee. He cahnot be permitted to say he is not ready,

If, on the day fixed for performance, he had the

ability, he must be considered, so far as the assignee is concerned, as having the
willingness.
4. The assignment of a contract, and notice of that assignment , creates no additioil'burden, nor does it impose any additional duty df active diligence upon the
contractor.

If the subject matter of the contract be left within the power and

under thecohtrl'of the assignor, the risk of its being impaired 'or destroyed, so
.as to defeat the performance, is assumed by the assignee. There is no principle
by which it would be thrown on the other party.
5. Where a foreign law is in dispute, whether there be such a law is a matter of
When it is shown in evidence, its construction and
fact for averment and proof
effect is for'the court.
1. It has been said that. the powers of a corporation are only such as the law of its
creation gives; but this leads to another question: what powers does its charter,
or act of creation, fairly and- properly construed, give ?
question of construction.

It is, in each case, a

Powers conferred upon corporations are of two descriptions: some are generalothers special and limited. Some have reference to the mode inwhich acts are
to be done, and are merely directory-others are in the nature of a limitation of
Third persons, acting in good faith, are not
usually to be affected by an excess or violation of the former, on the part of the
company; but of the latter, they are, the act itself must be regarded as illegal,
power or a condition precedent.

and knowledge is presumed.
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8. When the'organization of a railroad company takes place, which organization is
usually formed by the instrumentality of commissioners appointed for that purpose, the authority of the commissioners ceases ; and in the absence of any special
provisions to the contrary, all powers as to any further subscriptions to the capital stock vest in the corporate body. Its dealing with third persons, as to its
stock, must stand upon the footing of ordinary contracts.
9.. If the article which a party agrees to supply has a certain and known character,
that party has no right to change or alter its character, and still expect it to be
received in fulfillment of the contract, unless the change be within the contemplation of the parties. If the acts of one of the parties, after the making of a contract, have so injuriously affected the subject matter of the contract as to destroy
the benefits expected from it by the other party, this would be a defence.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
GIIOLSON, J.- This is an action brought upon an -agreement of
the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company, to
subscribe to the stock of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company. The action is brought by the plaintiff to enforce
an assignment in trust of the money due on the subscription, made
by the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago Railway Company.
The object of the action is to compel a specific execution of the
agreement, and thereby relieve the plaintiff from liabilities assumed
on the faith of the security given by the assignment. The trustee
to whom the assignment was made, it is alleged, refuses to take any
steps to carry out the agreement. The petition, therefore, brings
all the parties before the court, and asks to have the agreement
enforced by a payment of the subscription, and the application of
the money to the relief of the plaintiff and of others in a like
position, and there is also a prayer for general relief.
To the petition, the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad
Company has filed an answer, setting up seven several grounds of
defence. To all and each of these, there is a demurrer by the
plaintiff on the ground that they do not constitute any defence to
the action.
The questions involved by the demurrer to the grounds of
defence are, some of them, of a technical character, and do not affect
the merits of the controversy between the parties. I will first
dispose of the questions of this character, and then consider those.
which appear to be connected with the merits.
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The first ground of defence is an allegation that none of the shares
of the capital stock of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company, alleged to have been subscribed, have ever been
delivered or tendered to the defendant. Upon looking at the
agreement, it clearly appears that an actual delivery or tender of
the shares of stock is not a condition precedent to a demand of the
subscription. The amount subscribed was to be paid in instalments,
and certificates of stock were to be issued for the several
instalments paid. A readiness and willingness to issue the
certificates at the time payment was to be made, is all that could
have been required. 6 M. & G. 942; 8 M. & W. 372; 1 0. B 222.
The matter stated in the first ground of defence is not, therefore,
in itself sufficient to bar or preclude a recovery on the part of the
plaintiff; but it may raise the question whether the petition of the
plaintiff is not defective for not containing an averment of. a
readiness and willingness, on the part of the Cincinnati, Logansport
and Chicagn Railroad Company to deliver the certificates of stock ?
There are cases where delivery on payment is not a condition
precedent, and no tender need be shown; and yet an averment of
readiness and willingness, and notice thereof, will be required.
6 M. & -. 942; 8 M. & W. 372. If this case stood as a simple
action on the part of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company, to recover the money agreed to be paid for the
stock, it is my opinion that an averment of a readiness and
willingness to issue and deliver the certificates of stock would be
necessary. The right to enforce payment is not distinct and
independent from the ability to issue and deliver the stock: If the
defendants cannot get the stock, the payment of the money is not
to be enforced. The acts to be done must be regarded as contemporaneous.
Is the rule which would apply to the Cincinnati, Logansport and
Chicago Railway Company to be dispensed with, on account of the
different attitude in which the plaintiff stands, on account of facts
stated in the petition? What is the nature of the present action?
It is really for the specific execution of an assignment and trust, in
which the plaintiff has an interest, while the plaintiff may really
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have no greater or better right to demand the payment of money
from the defendant, than would the Cincinnati, Logansport and
Chicago Railway Company. Had there been no assignment he may
have the right to present his case in a different way. He may have
the right to bring the two parties before the court and compel a
performance of the contract and with that view institute an inquiry
whether it ought to be performed. If the defendant was prevented
from performing, at the time stipulated, by a want of readiness
and willingness on the part of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company, such a fact may really be considered to be more
in the knowledge of the defendant than of the plaintiff. So far as
the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago Railroad Company is
concerned, it must be considered, in respect to the plaintiff, as
both ready and willing. When a party havin 4 . the ability to
perform an executory contract on his part, assigns his interest in
such contract, he must be considered. as equitably bound to perform it, so as to give the benefit of it to the assignee. He cannot be permitted to say he is not ready. If, on the day fixed for
performance, he had the ability, he mnst be considered, so far as
the assignee is concerned, as having the willingness.
There are facts set out in the petition, which tend to show that
the defendants were permitted to take, and did take, possession of
the stock, so far as it was capable of possession. The delivery of
certificates would, under such circumstances, be really only an
additional evidence of a right, the enjoyment of which was already
complete.
In view, then, of the different position of the plaintiff, and of the
circumstances which he states in his petition, I do not think it is to
be regarded as fatally defective, for the want of an averment of a
readiness and willingness on the part of the Cincinnati, Logansport
and Chicago Railway Company to issue certificates of stock on
payment of the instalments agreed to be paid by the defendant.
The demurrer, therefore, to the first ground of defence will be
sustained.
The second ground of defence is, that the Cincinnati, Logansport
and Chicago Railway Company had no power, under the law of its
46
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creation, to agree to receive subscriptions to its capital stock, or to
issue certificates as provided in the agreement with the defendant,
and that, therefore, the agreement is invalid and void, and the
consideration for the undertaking on the part of the defendant
wholly fails. This, if true, is a good ground of defence, for, not to
speak of the objection of illegality, it is shown that the defendant
cannot get the stock, or that it would be worthless, and payment
for it ought not to be enforced. The point of the demurrer,
however, is, that the laws of Indiana should be set out, so that the
court might adjudge as to the illegality; in other words, it is
claimed that the defendant is pleading a matter of law as an issue
for the jury. Were the laws of Ohio under consideration, the
,objection might be good, and the defendant instead of pleading
illegality as a mjtter of fact, should properly demur to the petition,
which sets forth the contract alleged to be illegal. But there is a
difference when a foreign law is in dispute. Whether there be such
a law is a matter of fact for averment and proof. When it is shown
in evidence, its construction and effect may be matter for the
determination of the court. 11 Cl. & Fin. 115, 116; 50 E. C. L.
250; 10 Ala. Rep. 895, 897. Whether the Cincinnati, Logansport
and Chicago Railway Company had power to make such an agreement,
will probably be found to depend on the charter granted to it by
the Legislature of Indiana. That charter, being a law of another
State can only be properly brought before the court by its
introduction as evidence. When thus produced, being a written
instrument, its construction will be for the court. The demurrer
to this ground of defence will be overruled.
The sixth ground of defence is, that certain representations were
-made to induce the defendant- to enter into the agreement for the
subscription of stock; that these representations were untrue; that
theywere made by agents of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
-Railway Company for the purpose of inducing the Board of
Directors of the defendant to enter into the contract; that the
latter relied upon the truth of the same; "and by means of the
-same were fraudulently induced to consent to said subscription and
to said supposed agreement for the payment of the same."
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The point relied on in support of the demurrer is, that it does
not appear that the representations were made in bad faith, or with
knowledge of their untruth. Upon a demurrer to an answer the
inquiry is not whether allegations in it are sufficiently definite and
certain, but whether upon any fair and reasonable construction,
they make out a case of defence to the action. If by any fair and
reasonable intendment in favor of the pleading, it can be sustained,
under the liberal system provided by our Code, this should be done,
leaving the party, if he doubt as to the meaning of the pleading
and is not therefore able properly to meet it on the trial, to apply
to have it"made definite and certain. Having this rule in view, I
think the answer as to this ground must be deemed sufficient. The
general exception that the Board of Directors of the defendant
were fradulentl induced by the representations which are set out
to enter into the contract, may very fairly be construed as a charge
of a fraudulent knowledge or intent in tliose who made the
representations. It may also be remarked from the very nature of
some of the representations, if they were untrue in fact, it must,
have been known to the agents and officers of the Cincinnati,
Logansport and Chicago Railway Company.
The seventh ground of defence, to be properly understood,
requires a reference to certain agreements. It appears that on the
i3th December, 1853, the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company of the first part, and the Eaton and Hamilton, the
Richmond and Miami, the Cincinnati, Logansport, and Chicago
Companies of the second part, entered into an agreement for the
jointly stocking and running their respective roads, intending to
form a line from Cincinnati to Chicago'of a uniform gauge. The
agreement contained various stipulations for the benefit of' the
respective parties, and was to continue in force for twenty years,
and thereafter until either party give the other one year's previous
notice of its termination. On the same day, and in consideration
of the covenants contained in that agreement the defendant agreed
to subscribe to the capital stock of the Cincinnati, Logansport and
Chicago Railway Company six thousand shares of $50 each making
$300,000, said stock to be taken and paid for at the iate of seventf-
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five cents on the dollar, as follows:

100,000 in locomotives and

cars at their cost value, and the remaining $125,000 to be paid in
half-yearly instalments, beginning on the 1st July, 1855. Certificates of stock to be issued for the several instalments paid.
The ground of defence is, that the contract for a-running arrangement has been abandoned by the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago Railway Company; that, thereupon, it has been treated and
considered as abandoned and rescinded by all the :other parties.
A denial is added, that the $100,000- in locomotives and cars has
been paid, as alleged in the petition. From these primises, it is
claimed that the contract for subscription became, and was also
annulled and rescinded, and is no longer of any binding force or
obligation.
It is difficult to see how the performance of the first contract by
the parties thereto could be considered in the nature of a condition
precedent to the right to demand performance of the second contract. Undoubtedly the first contract -was a consideration and
inducement tG the second; but the covenants, and not their fulfillment, constituted, in law, that consideration and inducement-a
consideration executed at the time, as shown from its very nature.
It moved not only from the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company, but from the other parties, who united with it
in the first agreement. It could not be expected that their compliance was to be enforced by the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago
Railway Company. All that could be expected, and all that -was
required, as clearly shown by the language of the second agreement, was " the covenants." These covenants the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company might enforce or release at its
option. Substantially, a mutual release, or waiver, is all that is
shown in the seventh ground of defence, and for the reasons stated,
the other contract cannot be affected thereby, and the demurrer
must be sustained. Lewis vs. Clifton, 78 ]A. C. L. 255.

Returning to the d and 4th grounds of defence, which are of
vital import to the action of the plaintiff, they may, very properly,
be cousidere'.together, depending, as they do, iy my opinion, upon
the same point, They are both founded upon.a supposed want of
power in the defendant, to enter into the agreement on which the
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plaintiff relies. It is claimed, in the third ground of defence, that
the defendant could not enter such an agreement without the assent
of the holders of two-thirds of its stock ; and in the fourth ground
of defence, that the defendant was prohibited from subscribing in
aid of any railroad, unless it connected with its main line, and it is
alleged that the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago Railway did
not so connect.
The questions involved in this branch of the case depend on the
powers of the defendant under its -act of incorporatton. These
powers are derived from the legislativ enactments of Ohio, and of
them the court is bound to take notice. Reliance has been placed
in the argument by the counsel for both parties, upon the general
principles applicable to the question of the powers of a corporation.
It is claimed that they are only such as the law of its creation
gives. This is, undoubtedly, a correct proposition. But it does
not answer the question, and only leads to another. What are the
powers given to a corporation by the law of its creation, properly
construed ? Here a preliminary question arises. It is sought to
apply a strict rule of construction. A charter, it is said, must be
strictly construed, and so as only to embrace such powers as are
granted in express terms, or by necessary implication. Such is,
undoubtedly, the rule in certain classes of cases, arising upon the
construction of charters. Where, by the grant of the government,
privileges are conferred upon corporators, which as individuals
they could not exercise, such a grant should be construed strictly
against the corporators, and liberally toward the public. Any ambiguity in the terms of the grant must operate against the corporation and in favor of the public, and the corporation can claim
nothing that is not clearly given by the law." 9 Howard, 172,
192; 11 Peters, 589, 598: 11 C1. & Fin. 143, and 21 Conn. 306.
But in such cases, it is not meant "that the charter is to receive a
strained and unreasonable interpretation, contrary to the obvious
intention of the grant. It must be fairly examined and considered,
and reasonably and justly expounded." 9 Howard, 172, 192. And
this strict rule of construction cannot be properly extended to cases
in which, by the charter or grant, nothing is taken from the public,
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or the rights of the public are in any way infringed; where the corporation is really only an organized partnership, and the corporators are authorized to do as such, only acts which as individuals they
would have a perfect right to do. It will be found that the cases
in which this strict rule of construction has been applied, are chiefly
those in which corporations have claimed a delegation of some prerogative of the government as to take private property, or to exercise some franchise. There are cases in which a strict rule of construction has been sought to be applied on the ground of the mode
in which acts of incorporation are obtained. Their language, it is
said, is not that of the legislature, but of their promoters, and
should, therefore, be strictly construed. 49 Eng. Coin. Law Rep.
253, 288. This was said in reference to the mode of obtaining
grants of power to a railway company from the British Parliament,
which is different from the legislative practice in this State, and an
argument drawn from it can furnish no safe guide. It is more reasonable, as said recently in a case of this kind, to take the charter
"as we find it on the statute book, and give it operation and effect
according to the intention of the Legislature, to be gathered from
its provisions. 10 Maryl'd Rep. 536, 543.
Whether, therefore, the defendant had under its charter the
.power, which is the subject of consideration in this case, is a question
of construction. Powers conferred upon the defendant are either
general or special. The general corporate powers, whether taken in
the language of the original charter, or in that of the general railroad law of 1848, are quite extensive. They are certainly sufficiently broad, in the absence of any direct limitation, to authorize
the entering into the agreement which is the subject of the present
controversy. It is to be "deemed a body corporate." The ideal
being, called a corporation, has been defined "to be a continuous
identity; endowed at its creation with capacity for endless duration;
residing in the grantees of it and their successors, its acts being determined by the will of a majority of the existing body of its grantees
or their successors at any given time, acting within the limits imposed by the constitution of their body politic, such will being signified to strangers by writing under the common seal; having a name,
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and under such name a capacity for taking, holding and enjoying
all kinds of property, a qualified right of disposing of its possessions, and also a. capacity for taking, holding and enjoying, but
inaliepably, liberties, franchises, exemptions and privileges, together
with the right and obligation of suing and being sued only under
such name." Such, it is said, are the attributes of a corporation proper, that is to say, a corporation created merely as a corporation,
without any restrictive or limiting clauses in the instrument of creation. Grant on Corporations, 4, 5. 'But it rarely, if ever, happens
that a corporation is not subject to restrictions and limitations, and
these may be directory as to the mode of the exercise of its powers, or
in the nature of conditions precedent or limitations to the right to
exercise. With the former, I take it, third persons, acting in good
faith have no concern. A compliance with them may be enforced
as between the corporators and their agents, or as between the government and the corporation, but third persons should not be affected by a failure to comply, unless guilty of some complicity in the
acts of commission or omission. For example, if a railroad corporation have a general power to contract and be contracted with, or
to purchase any personal property, it may be there is, either express or implied, a restriction, that the subject matter of the contract shall be 'f necessary or convenient" for the objects of the
corporation. But surely, it cannot be required that a party called
on to supply any article to the officers of a railroad company, shall
take care to inform himself whether it be necessary or convenient
,to carry into effect the objects of the incorporation. It must be considered that any restriction of this character to the exercise of a
general power falls within the class of those which are merely
directory, Any other rule would make the numerous corporations
scattered over the country, instruments which might be readily used
to cheat and defraud the public. And it has been said that "the
safety of men, in their daily contracts, requires that this doctrine
of ultra vires should be confined within narrow bounds." .E.Counties R. Co. vs. Hawks, 38 lng. L. and E. 31 ; Bargate vs. Shortridge, 31 Eng. L. and E. 59, 14; 28 Pa. St. Rep. 339. If a
party dealing with the officers or agents of a corporation in refer-
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ence to a matter which may or may not be one properly within the
scope of its powers, according to the purpose or object intended,
knows that an improper purpose or object is in view (and such
knowledge might be inferred from the very nature of the subject
matter), then, as to him, the transaction would be illegal: not so
much, perhaps, because it was prohibited by the law, as because he
was complicated with a wrongful act and breach of trust. 'Where
an act is in itself illegal, the question of knowledge does not properly arise. Parties contracting as to such an act, must be supposed
to know its illegality. And this is the case as to those restrictions
on the powers of a corporation, which are in the nature of conditions precedent or limitations, shown by the express provisions of
its charter, or by inference from its terms. If upon a reasonable
and fair construction of the act of the legislature, from which the
corporation derives its powers, an intention appears, to prohibit
that which is the subject of a contract-to exclude it from the general powers of the corporation, or to provide that it shall be done
only in a specified mode, it necessarily follows, that the contract
cannot be sustained. It need not be averred or proved that both parties had knowledge of such an illegality, for being made illegal by a
law of the land, it is supposed to be known, and ignorance would be
no excuse. S. Y Railway vs. @. N. Railway, 9 Exch. 55, 84 ; X.
of Norwich vs. Norfolk B. Co., 4 El. and BI. 897; 1 Sandf.
Oh. Rep. 280; 3 Wend. 573; 1 Richardson, 281, 288; B.
Anglian B. Co. vs. B. Counties R. Co., 73 E. 0. L. Rep. 775,
813.
Such being, in my opinion, the rules by which the inquiry is to
be guided, I proceed to consider whether the agreement, to the illegality of which the third and fourth grounds of the defence are
directed, is subject to that objection. The third ground of defence
has been prepared in view of the provisions of the 4th section of
the act of 3d March, 1851, relating to railroad companies. It is
quite evident those provisions are enabling, and not restrictive. If
the power to do the acts mentioned existed, no intention is shown
to divest such power. If the power was then, for the first time
conferred, of course it may be very properly claimed that it could
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only be exercised under the condition of obtaining the assent of the
stockholders. Now, I cannot doubt but the defendant had power
to make such an agreement as the one in question, under its general powers. If this be so, there was no intention, on the part of
the legislature, even if its constitutional authority were admitted,
to. divest the defendant of the powers before granted. Here, it
will be observed, that while the general law of 1848 was, in 1849,
made part of the charter of the defendant, by a special act, there
is no averment that the defendant has ever adopted, as part of its
charter, any of the subsequent general laws.
The fourth ground of defence depends upon the construction of
the 6th section of the act of March 15th, 1849, which adopts as
the charter of the defendant, the railroad law of 1848. It is in
that section provided, that the defendant may "aid in the construction of any other line, or side line, to connect with its main line of
road." There is very great force in the argument that a direct and
express authority to aid in the construction of certain defined lines,
must be regarded as an exclusion of the power to aid in any other
line not coming within the description of those authorized. A contract to aid in the construction of a line not authorized, might be
considered as impliedly prohibited, and, therefore, void. It would
not be a, mere excess of power, or the exercise of a power in an
improper manner, but the doing that which the law prohibited; and,
in such a case, I should certainly feel bound by the authorities which
have been cited, to hold that the agreement to do that which was
so prohibited could not be enforced. The point, however, in which
both the third and fourth grounds of defence are, in my opinion,
defective, consists in the want of any averment that the agreement
under consideration was made "to aid in the construction of the
line of the Cincinnati, Logansport and Chicago Railway Company."
Nothing is said in either of the agreements, which have been before
described, of any such object. For aught that appears, all the
roads mentioned in the agreements had been constructed, and the
professed object of the first agreement is the stocking and running
the roads. To make good, therefore, the grounds of defence, it is
incumbent on the defendant to show that its broad, general powers
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were restricted and limited, not only as to aiding in the construction of lines of road by a subscription of stock, or otherwise, but as
to the bargaining ond contracting in any manner, or for any consideration, in relation to the purchase or subscription of stock.
It was admitted in the argument that it was competent for the
defendant to enter into an agreement for a running arrangement
such as the one made in this case. For the benefits of such an
agreement, it was competent, then, for the defendant to pay an
adequate consideration. The form of that consideration cannot be
material. It may be to pay money, or to take stock in another company at a reduced rate. In this case, the different companies with
which the defendant contracted, instead of exacting a moneyed consideration for their covenants, were content with the agreement of
the defendant to subscribe for stock in one of them; and this may
have been the same as a moneyed consideration to all. On its face,
it is certainly not an aiding in the construction of a line of railroad.
The purpose and object, a beneficial running arrangement, it is admitted, were valid, and I cannot say that the nature of the consideration to be given was invalid. If the real design was a mere
shift and contrivance to evade the law, the facts and circumstances
showing this, should be stated in the pleadings.
The fifth ground of defence remains to be considered. The substance of this ground of defence is, that after the agreement to
subscribe stock, the Cincinnati, Logansport, and Chicago Railway
Company, by acts stated in detail in the answer, so changed the
nature and character of its capital stock, as to make it substantially
a new stock, and entirely different from what the defendani agreed
to receive-in effect, destroying the subject matter of the contract,
and rendering it impossible of. performance. The acts which are
-claimed to have resulted in these consequences, are alleged to
have been done without the knowledge or assent of the defendant.
It appears from the pleadings, that the defendant is not to be
regarded as a subscriber of stock in an unorganized company, and
afterward uniting in the organization, but as contracting with an
organized company for a portion of its capital stock. Railroad
companies are usually formed by the instrumentality of commis-
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sioners appointed for the purpose. When the organization of the
company takes place, the authority of the commissioners ceases;
and, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, all
powers as to any further subscriptions to the capital stock, vest in
the corporate body. (Plank Boad vs. Koffman, 9 Maryl. 559568.) Its dealing with third persons as to its stock, must stand
upon the footing of ordinary contracts. If a corporate body
agrees to supply and furnish a certain quantity of its stock to a
third person for a specified price, I know of no rule that can govern
such a contract, which would not apply, in analogous circumstances,
to any other contract. If the article which a party agrees to
supply has a certain and known character, that party has no right
to change and alter its character, and still expect it to be received
in fulfillment of the contract. It is really a question of identity.
If the change be one which may be supposed to lbe within the contemplation of the parties, there can be no complaint. Such would
probably be presumed in reference to changes not substantially
affecting the nature and character of the article. But where the
change is radical, and, from the circumstances, clearly not contemplated, it would be manifestly unjust to enforce the contract, and,
particularly, where such a change was the result of the intentional
acts of the very party asking to have it enforced. Everhart vs.
Philadelhiaand Westehester 1. B. Co., 28 Pa. St. Rep. 339-352;
13 Illinois Rep. 504; 16 Mees. & Welsb. 804-808.
The question of the power of a corporation to make a change in
the character and nature of its stock, as by embracing another and
different purpose under the authority of the legislature, is not to
be confounded with the question whether, the change having been
made, a party is still bound to carry out an agreement to take the
stock. There may be a very marked difference between the position and rights of one who is actually a stockholder and corporator,
and one whom it is sought to make a stockholder and corporator.
The one who is actually in the corporation may be bound by the
acts of the majority, or may be compelled to resort to preventive
steps. The latter has the right to stand upon the terms of his con-
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tract with the corporation, and to require the delivery in fullfilment
of its terms of that which he was to receive.
There is another principle to be regarded in this case. The action, as before stated, is really for the specific performance of an
agreement. The object is to require the defendant to take the
stock and pay the price, and not merely for the .recovery of damages for a refusal to accept and pay. Now, in this view, if the acts
of one of the parties, after the making of a contract, have so injuriously affected the subject matter of the contract as to destroy the
benefits expected from it by the other party, such acts maypresent
a conclusive answer to an application for the exercise of a jurisdiction, which has always been considered discretionary, and only to
be afforded in cases where there has been diligence and good faith.
In view of these principles, if the facts stated show such a change
and alteration in the character of the stock, as may be considered
radical and material, and substantially affecting its identity, the
fifth ground of defence must be deemed sufficient. I am satisfied
that under the averments in the answer, such a change may be
made out by proof, and I cannot say as a matter of law, that admitting the facts stated, and all inferences that might be drawn
from them, there would be no such change and alteration, as the
rule on the .subject, which has been stated, would require.
It has been objected, however, that the defendant became actually
a stockholder, and must be considered as bound by and assenting to
the change in the character of the corporation and its stock. What
effect the conduct of the defendant in acting as a stockholder, and
voting all the shares of stock which were agreed to be subscribed,
may have, when established by proof, it is not now necessary to
inquire. Such acts can have no greater effect than showing knowledge and assent to the change and. alteration stated in the answer,
and any such knowledge or assent is denied. This denial, which
must be considered as sustaining the answer in this particular, is, it
is true, made in general terms, but upon a demurrer this has been
deemed sufficient. It may also be found that a party who, upon a
mere subscription, is allowed to vote and act as a stockholder, while
he may, by so doing, waive any matter before occurring, as to mat-

JAMES vs. RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

ters subsequent, which were inconsistent with his rights as a contracting party, would not be estopped. He might be regarded as
in an anomolous condition-in part stockholder, and in part a contractor to become a stockholder. He might have acted as a stockholder on the faith of a compliance with his contract to become one,
and on the breach of that contract, may very properly claim the
rights of a contracting party. Cases of this description will very
generally depend on their particular circumstances. And it may
be proper to add, that admitting the want of any direct assent on
the part of the defendant, to the changes made in the Cincinnati,
Logansport and Chicago Railway Company, as stated in the answer,
their character appears to have been such as to have been peculiarly objectionable to the defendant. If after such a change the
balance of an unpaid subscription could be recovered, it should only
be as a strict legal right.
One more view, which has been pressed as to this ground of defence, has to be examined. It has been claiiaed that such adefence,
though valid against the original contracting party, would not avail
against an assignee. Upon this point I feel no difficulty in coming
to a conclusion. The assignment of the contract, and notice of
that assignment, created no additional burden, nor imposed any additional duty of active diligence upon the defendant. .Mangle vs.
Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702. The defence is, in substance, a want of
ability on the part of one of the contracting parties to comply with
the.terms of the contract.. If this want of ability had been caused
by the defendant, after-notice of the assignment, then the assignee
might justly complain of such an act as a fraud upon his rights.
But how can it be claimed that the assignment and notice devolved
upon the defendant the duty of so supervising and controlling the
acts of the assignor, that. a continued ability to perform should
exist? -It would be for the assignee, and not the defendant, to protect and secure rights depending upon the conduct of the assignor.
If. the. subject.matter of the contract be.left within the power, and
under the control. of -the assignor, the risk-of its being impaired or
destroyed, so as to defeat the perfrgmance, is assumed by the as-
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signee. There is no principle by which it could be thrown on the
other party.
The result of the views which have been expressed, is, that the
demurrer must be sustained as to the 1st, 3d, 4th and 7th grounds
of defence, and overruled as to the others.
Ferguson & Long, for plaintiff.
Worthington & Matthews, for defendant.

In the Kentucky Court of Appeals-July 14, 1858.
AMBROSE E. CAMP vs. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH

COMPANY.'

Where a telegraph company, among the terms of the transmission of messages, announced that they would not be responsible for the mistakes of "unrepeated
messages," and repeated messages were charged half in addition to the usual
price for transmission, of which terms the plaintiff bad notice, but did not require
the message to be repeated or pay the additional charge, and a mistake happened in the transmission of the message which caused the plaintiff pecuniary
loss, it was held, that he could not recover, it not appearing that the mistake
was occasioned by negligence or incompetency on the part of the company.

The court being sufficiently advised of the facts, the following
opinion, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
SIMPSON, J.-This action was brought against the Western Union
Telegraph Company for failing to transmit correctly a communication from the appellant, at Louisville, to D. Gibson & Co., at Cincinnati. The plaintiff alleged, in his petition, that the defendant
undertook, for compensation then paid, to transmit from Louisville,
Kentucky, to D. Gibson & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, a proposition
to purchase two hundred barrels of whiskey at fifteen cents per
gallon, and that instead of transmitting the proposition correctly,
the communication as made, represents him as offering sixteen cents
per gallon for whiskey.
He also alleged that Gibson & Co. advised him that they accepted
his proposition, and immediately forwarded to him two hundred
barrels of whiskey, under the belief that he had offered them sixteen
I For the opinion of the court below, see ante, p. 443.
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cents per gallon for it, which was received by him under the belief
that it had been sold to him at fifteen cents per gallon. He further
alleged, that in consequence of the failure of defendant to transmit
the message entrusted to it, and the transmission by it of a message
of a different import, he was compelled to pay sixteen cents per
gallon for the whiskey, and had thereby sustained a loss to the
amount of $100. The Telegraph Company by way of defence
relied upon a notice of the terms and conditions on which messages
by it for transmission, which, so far as they are applicable to the
present case, are as follows :
"1The public are notified that in order to guard against mistakes
in the transmission of messages, every message of importance ought
to be repeated by being sent back from the station at which it is to
be received to the station from which it is originally sent; half the
usual price for transmission will be charged for repeating the message.
"The Company will not be responsible for mistakes or delays of
unrepeated messages from whatever cause they may arise."
It is alleged in answer, that the plaintiff had notice of the original
terms and conditions, and sent the message subject to them, but did
not require the message to be repeated, nor agree to pay for its
repetition.
There is no allegation in plaintiff's petition that the mistake was
occasioned by negligence, or was the result of incompetency, or
want of proper skill on the part of the agents who were employed
by the Company to act as operators in the sending and receiving
of dispatches, but the failure of the Company to comply with its
contracts to transmit the message correctly, is alone relied upon as
the foundation of the plaintiff's right to , recovery in this action.
The proof shows that it is impracticable to transmit telegraphic
communications with absolute accuracy at all times, and that such
communications, from the very nature of the medium through which
they are made, are subject not only to occasional interruptions and
delays, but also inaccuracies in words and expressions. It may be
therefore reasonably presumed that the failure to deliver this message correctly, was the result of a mistake to which such communi-
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cations are liable, and which will sometimes occur even where the
utmost care and skill are exercised.
The questiox then is, was the Company bound at all events to
transmit the dispatch accurately, or had it the legal right to modify
its liability by giving a public notice and bringing it home to the
plaintiff, of the terms and conditions on which it alone would be
bound for mistakes in the transmission of messages?
It is contended that the responsibility of the Company is fixed
and defined by law, and cannot be changed or modified by any terms
and conditions that the Company may think proper to prescribe.
It can hardly be doubted that the Company and the person sending a message might by express contract regulate the extent of the
liability of the former for any mistake that might occur; here, however, there was no express contract between the parties, but the
Company gave notice of the terms and conditions upon which it
was willing to be responsible, and the plaintiff acted under that
notice in sending the message.
We do not deem it necessary to decide in this case to what extent
a telegraph company has a right to limit its liability by a notice to
those for whom it undertakes to transmit messages. All that we
are now required to decide is, whether the condition which the Company relied on in this case is reasonable, and such a one as it had
a right to prescribe.
The public are admonished, by the notice, that in order to guard
against mistakes in the transmission of messages, every message of
importance ought to be repeated; a person desiring to send a message is thus apprised that there maybe a mistake in its transmission,
to guard against which it is necessary that it should be repeated.
He is also notified that if a mistake occur the Company will not be
responsible for it unless the message be repeated. There is nothing
unreasonable in this condition. It gives the party sending the
message the option to send it in such a manner as to hold the Company responsible, or to send it for a less price at his own risk. If
the message be unimportant he may be willing to risk it without
paying the additional charge; but if it be important, and if he
wishes to have it-sent correctly, he ought to be willing to pay the
cost of repeating the message.
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This regulation, considering the incidents to which the business
is liable, is obviously just and reasonable. It does not exempt the
Company from responsibility, but only fixes the price of that responsibility ; and allows the person who sends the message either to
transmit it at business risk at the usual price, or by paying in addition
one-half the usual price to have it repeated, and thus render the
Company liable for any mistake that may occur.
The plaintiff must, therefore, be regarded as having sent the message in this case at his own risk, inasmuch as he failed to have it
repeated, and consequently the Company was not liable for the mistake. It is unnecessary, therefore, to decide whether the plaintiff
was legally responsible for the sixteen cents per gallon for the
whiskey, or only for the price which he actually offered.
It is therefore considered that the judgment of the Chancellor,
dismissing the plaintiff's petition, be affirmed.

In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, June, 1858.
DUTY MOWRY, ASSIGNEE OF DAVID MOWRY, APPELLANT, VS. HANS
CROOKER, RESPONDENT.
1. Personal property follows the law of the domicile of the owner as to transfer;
and the execution of an assignment of personalty passes the personalty wherever
situate, ipso facto, to the assignee, provided the assignment be valid in the State

where it is executed.
2. It is sufficient, if any notice of the assignment comes to the debtor; the assignment works an equitable transfer of the debt; and the notice will charge the
debtor with the duty of payment to the assignee.
3. An attachment subsequently laid, although before the actual reduction of the
money into the assignee's possession, cannot prevail against him.

Nelson Cross, of counsel, and
appellant, and

AT.

C. Gridley, attorney for

J. E. Arnold, attorney for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, J.-This was a voluntary assignment of property, in trust
for creditors, made and executed in the State of Rhode Island. It
47
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appears that the assignor, David Mowry, the assignee Duty,
Willis Cook the judgment creditor, who refused to become a party
to the assignment, and Lippett, the assignee of this judgment, and
the attaching creditor, were all citizens of that State. And it is
further conceded that the assignment of David Mowry was executed
conformably to the laws of Rhode Island, and was valid and effectual
to pass the title of the property, real and personal, to the assignee
Duty, at the time within the limits of the State, belonging to the
assignor. Such being the case, we suppose, upon principles of
public policy and of judicial comity generally recognized by the
courts of the different States of the Union, we must sustain the
validity of the assignment, and hold that it operated as a transfer
of the debt against Mr. Arnold, (which was in the hands of the
appellee,) to the assignee, even though it should be admitted, that
the assignment was not good by the laws of this State. The law
upon this subject is laid down with great distinctness and ability in
the following cases, to which it only seems necessary to refer without comment, to show the considerations which have induced tbe
courts of our sister States to adopt this doctrine in regard to voluntary assignments of personal property: 'Whipple vs. May'er, 16
Pick. 25; Daniels vs. Willard, ib. 86; Burlock vs. Taylor et al.,
ib. 335; Means vs. Hapgood, 19 ib. 105; Warren vs. Copelin, 4
Met. 595; Holmes vs. Bemsen, 4 J. 0. R. 486; same case, in
20 Johns R. 262; Abrahams vs. Plestors, 3 Wend. 566; Hfoyt vs.
Thompson, 1 Selden, 362; Atwood et al. vs. The Protective Is.
Co., 14 Cowen R. 555; Saunders vs. 'illiams et al., 5 N . H. R.
213 ; Sanderson et al. vs. Bradford J. Trustee, 10 do. 260 ; Milen
vs. Moreton, 6 Bing. 853. See also Harrisonvs. Story, 5 Cranch,
289; Brasber vs. West et al., 7 Peters, 608 ; Black vs. Zacharie,
.3 How. 483. Story's Conflict of Laws, sec. 883 et seq., and cases
cited by him in the notes. Assuming, then, that the personal property had no locality, but followed the law of the domicil of the
owner as to the transfer and disposition thereof, and that by the
execution of the assignment, the personal property, wherever
situated, passed ipso facto to the assignee, and that the assignment
being good and valid in the State where executed, must be sustained
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here on the ground of comity, and we have then to inquire whether
the assignee, by neglecting to give the appellee notice of the assignment, and reducing the property to possession, has been guilty of
such laches as to enable the attaching creditor to hold it as
against him.
From the statement of facts filed in this case, it appears that the
assignment was executed on the 1st of December, 1857, and that
the appellant accepted the trusts and entered upon the discharge of
his duties as assignee; that the creditors of David Mowry, with the
exception of Cook, gave their assent to the assignment, and executed the release therein provided; and that the appellee had
information, by way of rumor, of the assignment before the attachment, but from whom or when he cannot say. Further, that on
the 21st of May, 1857, Lippett, the assignee of Cook's judgment,
commenced an action in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee county,
against David Mowry, and attached the money in dispute in the
hands of the appellee; and that on the 7th day of June, 1857, a
written notice of the assignment was personally served on the
appellee, and a demand made on behalf of the appellant, for the
moneys in his possession. Also, that the appellee has not made
answer to the process of garnishment under the attachment, and
still holds the moneys subject to the opinion and judgment of this
court.
As already intimated, we suppose the effect of the assignment
was to operate at least as an equitable transfer of the debt against
Mr. Arnold, in the hands of the appellee, to the appellant. lTndoubtedly, if Mr. Arnold or the appellee, after the assignment, and
before any notice thereof, had paid over the money to the assignor,
they would have been discharged, and the present action could not
have been sustained. The object of notice was to charge the debtor
-with the duty of payment to the assignee. And probably, if the
money had been attached in the hands of the appellee, by a creditor
of the assignor, and paid over under an order of court before notice
of the assignment, it could not again be recovered. But before the
appellee answered the garnishee process, and confessedly, while the
money was in his hands, he received a written notice of the assign-
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ment and demand of the money on behalf of the appellant. And
it also appears that the appellee had information, by way of rumor,
of the assignment before the attachment. We think this was all
that was necessary for the protection of the appellee, and to maintain the title of the appellant to the money.
It was insisted by the argument of the counsel for the appellee,
that it was the duty of the assignee, in order to perfect his title to
this money, to give notice -of the assignment, and to reduce the
money to his possession within a reasonable time. "The notice
was indispensable to charge the debtor with the duty of payment to
the assignee, so that if, without notice, he paid the debt to the
assignor, or it was recovered by process against him, he would be
discharged from the debt." Story's Conflict of Laws, sec. 896.
Further than this we do not think the notice was material in this
case. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
HENRIETTA TROWBRIDGE vs. C. T. CARLIN, HER HUSBAND.
C. T. CARLIN VS.

HENRIETTA TROWBRIDGE, HIS WIFE.

1. Mutual insults and outrages, the fruit of mutual provocations, unless there be a
palpable disproportion of guilt as between the parties, furnish no sufficient ground

for divorce.
2. Disappointment in the marriage relation, and incompatibility of temper, are not
causes for decreeing a judicial separation between husband and wife; but outrages
and cruel treatment of a nature to render conjugal life intolerable, provided the
complaining party is comparatively innocent, are sufficient to found a decree.

8. The texts of the civil law on this subject cited, and commented on.
4. The doctrine of the Canon law adopted in Louisiana.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SPOFFORD, J.-If all the evidence which soils this record is to be
credited, it proves great misconduct on the part of both spouses in
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the mutual relation which both are trying to dissolve. Crimination
and recrimination, blows, and words harder than blows, have succeeded their marriage vows of reciprocal forbearance, fidelity and
love.
A little more than ten years ago, the appellee, then an elderly
man with a fortune, married the appellant, a young girl without one.
The first that we hear of them is that they arrived on the husband's
plantation, in the parish of St. Mary, " looking cross" at each other.
Bickerings soon arose about the management of the household;
favorite servants of the master were found disrespectful to their
mistress, and had to be chastised, or sold. The lady had misunderstandings with the overseers, and they left. Abusive language,
revolting to the ear of decency, is said by one of the overseers to
have been uttered, in his presence, to the husband by the wife,
apparently under the stings of jealousy. Two ladies testify that, in
their presence, the husband upbraided his wife with being "of no
account," saying " that she did not suit him, and that he was sorry
he had ever married her." One of them deposes that he also traduced her family, and both say that to these reproaches she answered
meekly and with tears. Notwithstanding occasional outbreaks and
altercations of this sort, relieved, it would seem, by some placid
intervals, time went on and three children were born of the marriage.
Although each parent is proven to have been tenderly devoted to
the children, these new ties do not appear to have drawn them closer
to each other. Indeed, the displays of temper on both sides seem
rather to have increased in intensity; and it is admitted that on one
occasion at least, the father resorted to violence to correct the
mother of his children.
About a year before the present suits were brought, and nearly
nine years after the marriage, the husband instituted an action for
a separation of bed and board against his wife; but one of his overseers testified that he was persuaded to abandon it by her tears and
promises of amendment. It was abandoned shortly after its institution.
At length, the present cross actions were brought on the same
day, in which each spouse, after a glowing recital of grievances
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suffered, and a careful suppression of grievances inflicted, claimed a
judgment of separation against the other, with a right to the custody
of the three children, which each party seems very solicitous to
retain.
The district judge, expressing no doubt as to'the truth of any of
the testimony, concluded that the husband was the aggrieved party,
and gave him a judgment of separation, with the custody of the
children.
The wife has appealed.
Although the conduct of both parties appears to have been highly
censurable, it is impossible to say, from the record before us, which
was first or most in fault. Their errors were of a kindred character
-ebullitions of temper, springing from disappointment, a spirit of
retaliation; and a lack of self-control.
In a case like this, where the faults of the parties ate so nearly
balanced, and are of so similar a nature, the serious question arises,
can either be heard in a court of justice to complain of the other ?
Should not the conduct of each toward the other close the mouths
of bth ?
An affirmative answer to this question was given by one of the
sages of the Roman law, treating, however, of the pecuniary inter"Papinianus lib. XL Quoestionum.
ests of the spouses only:
Viro atque uxore mores invicem accusantibus, causam repudii dedisse
utrumque pronuntiatum est? Id ita, accipi debet, ut eq lege, quam
ambo contempserunt, neuter vindicetur; paria enim delicia mutug
pensatione dissolvuntur." Dig. Lib. xxiv, Tit. iii, 1. 39
The canon law adopted this principle of compensation, in refusing
divorces where the parties were guilty of similar offences towards
each other. Caus. 32, q. vi. Can. I.
Coquille and Domat seem to have recognized something like this
rule as a part of the ancient French law.
Under the Napoleon Code two schools arose, which divided upon
this question. Duranton T. ii., No. 574. Valette and Massol held
that a demand for a separation is barred on either side, by mutual
faults of the same description; in the language of i. Duranton, "]a
rgciprocit6 des torts doit aussi, en ggn6ral, produire une fin de non-
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recevoir, surtout lorsqui'ils sont de m6me nature." On the other
side, among those holding that where both parties have been guilty
of mutual outrages and ill-treatment, both should have a decree of
separation, must be classed the great names of Toullier, ii., 764,
Mareadd, i., 769, M. Demolombe, iv., 415, and probably the weight
both of doctrinal and judicial authority in the modern jurisprudence
of France.
The district judge cited only the opinion of Toullier. But it must
be remembered that this is a question of Louisiana law. Our code,
our jurisprudence and our manners differ, in many respects, from
those of France, although, to a considerable extent, derived from
that source.
The doctrine of the canon law and of Duranton, on the point
under consideration, appears to have been adopted at a very early
period, and frequently enforced by our predecessors. In Durand
vs. Ber husband, 4 Martin, 0. S. 174, it was held " that the law
which provides for a separation from bed and board in certain cases,
is made for the relief of the oppressed party, not for interfering in
quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal excesses and outrages."
In Pigneguy's case, 9 Lou. 420, the wife's claim for a separation
was rejected, although it was proved that her husband had used
personal violence towards her on one occasion, the court remarking
that the evidence gave color to the assertion that she provoked the
ill-treatment by her violent temper.
In Rowley's case, 10 Lou., 571, the court said, the argument that
after what had occurred between the parties it would be impossible
for them to live together, was not a justification for a decree of
separation.
In Lalande vs. Jore, 5 Ann. 3-3, ajudgment of separation obtained
by a wife for defamation by her husband, was reversed because the
conduct of the wife had been marked by exasperation and violence
towards her husband. _Durand'scase was cited with approbation,
and also Warring'scase, 2 Phillimore, 132; 'where it was intimated
by an English court that, if the conduct of the party complaining
had been outrageous, the remedy must first be sought in a reformation of conduct by the complainant.
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And in .2'aulet vs. .Her husband, 6 Ann. 403, where as in this
case, both parties demanded a separation, and the district court
granted it in favor of the husband, the judgment was reversed and
both parties were turned out of court, because they were both in the
wrong, having been guilty of reciprocal outrages.
To ascertain what is a just limitation upon the right of divorce is
one of the most difficult of social problems. To fix this limitation
is an attribute of sovereignty.
Under the law of Louisiana, as hitherto interpreted, disappointment in the marriage relation and mere incompatibility of temper
are not causes for a judicial separation between husband and wife;
excesses, outrages and cruel treatment of a nature to render the conjugal life intolerable are, but with this qualification, that the party
complaining must be comparatively innocent of conduct similar to
that complained of, in order to obtain a decree.' Mutual insults and
outrages, the fruit of mutual provocations, unless there be a great
and palpable disproportion of guilt as between the parties, furnish
no sufficient ground of action to either.
This being the doctrine of the case heretofore adjudged in this
State, we would not feel at liberty to disturb it, although it might
conflict with our views of policy. But, notwithstanding the vigorous and able assaults that have recently been made upon this rule
in France, and notwithstanding the inconveniences it may occasionally
work, its manifest tendency is to induce greater circumspection in
entering upon the most important of civil contracts, greater forbearance in undergoing the petty annoyances of domestic life, and a.
more general suppression of such scandalous scenes as it has been
our painful duty to review in this cause.
I, therefore, concur in the decree dismissing both actions, at the
appellees' costs.
1

See Bishop on Marr. and Div.,
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SILYAS & CO. vs. LOMMAN & MACHLIN.

In the Common, Pleas of York County, Pa.
REX, SILVAS AND CO. vs. LOMMAN AND MACHLIN.
An execution issued against A, a member of a firm, and was levied upon his interest
in the firm property: then a second, issued against B, the other partner, and was
levied on his interest: afterwards a third against A and B, as partners, was levied
on the firm property: It was held that the Sheriff ought to have sold on the
writ against the firm the interest of all the partners, and to have paid the firm
debts in preference to those of the individual creditors.

Samuel Lomman and George W. 'Machlin,entered into partnership on the first day of October, 1855, and continued to do business
as such up to the 23rd of July, 1856, when the sheriff, upon an execution of Rex, Silvas and Co. vs. Emanual Lomman, levied upon the
interest of said Lomman in the partnership effects. On the 26th
executions issued; fenry L. Xing vs. George W. Mae/din, Mary
Dare vs. George W. Machlin, and afterwards on the same day two
others were issued; Emanual Lomman, for the use of Jacob Coover
vs. Gteorye "W.Machlin, and Jacob Uoover, Sr. vs. Emanual Lomman and George T. 2fachlin, partners in trade under the name and
firm of Lomman and Machlin. Upon the execution against George
W. Macblin, the sheriff returned, "levied on the 28th of July upon
the interest of George W. Machlin, in the partnership effects, &c."
Upon the execution against the firm of Lomman and Machlin, he
returned" levied on the 28th of July upon the personal property of
Lomman and Machlin, in a firm as merchants, etc." Upon the execution against Lomman, the sheriff returned "levied upon the interest
of Emanual Lomman in the partnership effects, etc." On the 2nd
of August the plaintiffs in the individual executions gave a written
notice to the sheriff to make sale of the interest of each partner on
the writs that first came to his hands-On the 11th of August the
sheriff advertised the partnership effects for sale on the 18th of
August; but before a sale was made it was agreed by the several
plaintiffs that in order to secure the best price for the property levied
on and make a good title to the purchaser therefor, a sale should be
made of the separate and joint interest at the same time, and that
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the rights of the several plaintiffs should not be prejudiced by such
sale: nor by the sheriff's return, and that the money be paid in courr
for distribution.
The auditor appointed to make distribution reported that the
execution creditors of the firm were entitled to the fund in court.
. To the report of the auditor the following exceptions were filed;
1st. the auditor erred in not awarding to Rex, Silvas & Co., on
fi. fa. against Emanual Lomman one-half of said proceeds of sale, after
deducting the expenses of audit.
2nd. The auditor erred in not awarding to Henry L. King on his
fi. fa. against George W. Machlin, the amount of debt, interest and
costs thereof.
3rd. The auditor erred in not awarding to Mary Dare on her
fi. fa. against George W. Machlin, the amount of debt, interest and
costs thereof.
4th. The auditor erred in awarding the proceeds of sale to be
distributed to Coover, Cannon, Mumma, and Fithian, Jones and Co.
and not awarding said proceeds of sale to Rex, Silvas & Co., Henry
L. King and Mary Dare, on their respective fi. fas. which came to
hands of sheriff, prior to in order of time to the fi. fas. of the persons to whom the money is awarded.

V. B. Reesey and E. Chapin, for Rex, Silvas and CompanyMary Dare and Henry L. King.
T. B. Cochran and J. Cr. Campbell, for Coover.
E vans and Mayer, for Fithian, Jones and Co.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, J.-It is a well settled principle of the law of partnership
that the joint effects belong to the firm. The corpus of the partnership property is joint, and the individual interest is that which
remains after satisfying all the joint debts. It therefore follows that
a sale of the interest of one partner either by transfer or execution
passes only the separate interest of that partner, subject to the debts
of the firm. The reason that it is so is not in consequence of any
right inherent in the creditors; or any equity in them that demands
a preference, but because it is a part of the contract between the
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partners. It is one of the incidents of the relation existing between
them; established for the purpose of preventing the joint capital
from being withdrawn without the consent of all. And so exclusively is that equity in the partners, and not in the creditors, that
one partner can sell to the other, so as to make his share separate
property ; ex parte Peake, 1 Maddock, Ohy, R. 197. And although
the reverse was held in Anderson vs. Maitly, 4 Brown 0. 0. 423,
all subsequent cases reject its authority: and if they refer to itassert that it was decided on the ground that the arrangements
between the partners were fraudulent. But where the transaction is
fair and honest and is an actual transfer of the effects; its validity
is not how a controverted question. Ex parte Raffia, 6 Vesey, jr.
191; Ex parte Williams, 11 Vesey, jr. 3. Where there is a disposition of the interest of all the separate partners, whether by sale,
voluntary assignment, or execution, the equity which requires that
the joint debt should be paid out of the joint effects, is destroyed,
and the joint creditors can claim no preference, but must rely upon
the individual responsibility of each of the partners. Doner vs.
Stauffer, 1 Pa. Rep. (Pen. & Watts,) 205; Baker's Appeal, 9
Harris, 76.
In this case it is contended that, as the individual interest of
Lomman was first levied upon, and subsequently that of Machlin,
that there was nothing left to be levied upon by the third execution.
This would be so if the sale had been effected and the property
changed before it was issued; for then we would have a case similar
to those of Doner vs. Stauffer, and Baker's Appeal. In each of
these cases the partnership creditors had no execution, and thie funds
sought to be charged had passed from the hands of the original
partners who contracted the debts. But this is not so in the case
we are considering; for after the writs of execution had been issued
against the individual members of the firm, executions were issued
against the firm itself; and from that moment the execution against
Lomman bound his individual interest, subject to the equity of his
partner, that against Machlin his individual interest, subject to the
equity of Lomman; and that against the firm the corpus or partner.
ship effects as such: not for the benefit of creditors, but to effectuate
the equity which is essential to the partnership relation. I admit
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if the first two executions only existed, that by sales upon them the
whole title would pass. But before that was effected the third execution came in; and attached itself to the joint interest so firmly, that
the sale of both the individual interests could not free them from
the lien thus created, unless the partnership execution creditors could
claim the money in preference to the individual execution creditors.
If they could not, then the individual creditors could defeat the
equity of the separate partners and substitute the fund, pledged at
the commencement of the partnership to pay firm debts, into a fund
to pay individuals debts. Nor does it appear to me to be an answer
to this objection, to say if there were executions only against individual partners, the firm debts would get nothing: for where the
firm debts have no lien it cannot be otherwise. But where the lien
for partnership debts attaches previously to the change of title;
through that lien the right of the partnership to have the firm debts
paid first is preserved, or as has been said "through their equity is
the payment of the firm debts worked out." But to this it is objected
that the lien of the individual creditors attached first, and that the
first fl. fa. created a lien on all Lomman's interest subject to the
equity of his partner, that the second created a lien on all Machlin's
equity, together with his remaining interest, and that nothing then
remained to levy upon for the partnership creditors. But it must
be remembered that a levy does not change the title, nor vest the
property in the first execution creditors. It is true, goods are bound
from the delivery of the fi. fa. to the sheriff; yet the property of
the defendant in them is not directed by the delivery of the writ;
nor by the levy; but by a levy and sale. Sewell on Sheriff, 259.
Watson on Sheriff, 176; Duncan vs. MlComber, 10 Watts, 255.
"It has never been said, much less adjudged, that the officer, the
creditor, or any body else, becomes vested by means of the seizure
alone with the absolute property in the goods." Lytle vs. Mahaffey,
8 Watts, 215. And although in general it is the duty of the sheriff
to sell on the first execution, yet where he has an execution that
binds the superior interest and to which all other interests are subordinate, he ought to sell upon it; because he thus disposes of the
whole title, and in this way only can the equities of the several
members of the firm be preserved. If a sale was made on the fi. fa.
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against Lomman, his interest would be sold subject to his partner's
equity, and the lien of the execution of the firm debt: and the other
partner's interest would be sold subject to the interest of Lomman
or those who purchased it, and to the firm execution. The confusion
and uncertainty as to what was selling at sales thus made is obviated
by at once selling on the execution against the firm the whole partnership property. The policy of the law certainly is, that titles procured through sheriff's sales should be free from doubt and uncertainty, that every purchaser should know what he was buying, and
that every thing sold at sheriff's sale should be sold so that it would
bring a full price. In no other way could these objects be effected,
in cases like the present, than by selling the joint interest of the firm
at one operation, and distributing the proceeds according to the
respective rights of the claimants; which in this case would be, first
to pay the executions against the firm, and if any surplus remained
then the executions in favor of the creditors of the individual members of the firm pro rata;paying due regard to the interest of their
several debtors in the property sold. Nor is this view without some
sanction from our own Supreme Court, for in Cooper's Appeal, 2
Casey, 262,where executions were issued first against separate parties
and afterwards against the firm, the sheriff sold the whole stock, and
the proceeds were finally distributed in the manner we hold that they
should here be. In that case Mr. Justice Lowrie remarked, "a sale
so made would be irregular if it was not a necessary result of the circumstances" for the sheriff "to execute his writs so as to join distinct
parties and interests in the question of distribution." But that
learned jurist certainly saw, that it would be the necessary results
of the circumstances of all such cases that a sale must be so made ; and
that justice could be done in no other way; and only refrained from
saying so as the case did not require it; because there the execution
of the firm creditor, though last in order of time, was allowed a preference without objection in the court below.
The exceptions are therefore dismissed, and the report of the
auditor confirmed.
NoT.-The exceptants severally appealed to the Supreme Court for the middle
district at its last term. The decree of the court below was affirmed and the case
will be reported under the name of Coover's Appeal, 5 Casey, 9.-Eds. Am. .L. B.

CANAL COMPANY vs. LOURY ET AL.:

In the Court of Common Pleas of Brie County, Pa.
THEY ERIE CANAL COMPANY

'Vs. MORROW B. LOl RY ET AL.

A court of equity will not interfere to restrain legal proceedings, where the complainant has an adequate remedy at law.

The defendants obtained judgment in this court against the
plaintiffs, on their bonds given for the construction of their canal,
and issued attachment executions, and attached moneys due and
belonging to the company, in the hands of the president, treasurer,
managers, and others, and plaintiffs filed this bill for an injunction
to restrain plaintiffs from proceeding with their attachments, or any
other legal proceedings, to collect their debts; to which defendants
demurred, for that plaintiffs had a full and entire remedy at law, and
that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter, and joinder and
issue.
.Douglassand Lyon, for demurrer, cited Purdon's Digest, page
805; Gilder vs. .errin, 6 Wh. 522i Jiagner vs. Heyberger, 7
W. & S., 104; Bri Equity, 240-2, 49, 167; Commonwealth vs.
Bank ofPennsylvania, 8 W. & S., 184; Commissioners vs. Long,
1 Par. Eq. Cases, 152; Commonwealth vs. Bush, et al., 2 Harris,
186; Pur. Di. 170, sec. 84; Idem, 883, sec. 28; Pleasants vs.
Cowden, 7 W. & S., 379; Ridge Turnpike Co. vs. Peddle, 4 Barr,
490; 1 T. & H., 128, 761, 763, 863.
Marshall,contra, cited Bevans vs. Dingman's-Choice Turnpike,
10 Barr, 174.
The opinion of the court was delivered Jan. 2, 1858, by
DERICEsoN,

J.-The defendants bring several suits to the courts

of this county, on bonds of the company, and having obtained judgments, they issued execution attachments and served them on the
officers, agents and employees of the company, to obtain satisfaction. To this latter course of procedure the company objects, and
has filed its present bill, asking for an injunction to restrain the
defendants in their action, alleging, as a reason therefor, that the
company is insolvent, and that the funds on hand are essentially
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necessary to the keeping of the canal in a safe and navigable condition, and that if these funds are taken from the control of the
muanagers, an irreparable mischief and loss must inevitably follow.
The defendants have demurred to this bill, and for the reasons
assigned, ask that it may be dismissed.
Without examining the merits of the bill or determining what
the ultimate issue between the parties may be, or deciding upon the
jurisdiction and power of the court in the matters involved, it is
enough for the present to say, that the company have the most full,
ample and complete remedy in the proceedings instituted in the
attachments-to an extent, perhaps, greater than it could have
under the bill if it went on to a final hearing on answer and testimony. If I had any doubts of this, the action of the court might
be different from what it now is. But, as the issuing of executions
on judgments obtained, can ixi no sense be said to be contrary to
law, when the record itself presents nothing to forbid it, it would
be an assumption of power, which none but a chancellor of unlimited jurisdiction can exercise, to arrest the creditors in the use
of the remedies to secure the fruition of what they claim to be their
dues, by laying upon them the strong arm of the court. This is
never to be done except where all other sources of redress at law
-re cut short, or the mischief sought to be prevented would be
wholly irreparable.
For these reasons the demurrer is sustained, and the injunction
prayed for denied.

In the Supreme Court of.Pennsylvania, January,1857.
CAMPBELL AND

PHARO'S APPEAL.

SINER'S ArPEA-L.

1, It seems, that where land is sold under an executory contract, liens against the
equitable estate of the vendee will be postponed to a purchase money mortgage
executed on the subsequent conveyance of the legal estate, though that mortgage
be not recorded within sixty days: and though it be made to a third person, and
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not to the vendor; provided it be given as a part of the same transaction, and,
in fact, to secure the purchase money. Foster's Ap eal, 3 Barr, 79, semble
overruled.
2. The vendee of a lot of ground under a parol contract entered into possession
before payment of the purchase money, and erected a building. Afterwards, by
an arrangement between the vendor and the owner of the equitable estate, a conveyance was made to the latter, who, at the same time and as part of the same
transaction, executed a mortgage of the premises to a third person, to secure the
purchase money, which was advanced by him to the vendor. The mortgagee
had no notice, actual or constructive, of the previous existence of the equitable
estate; and the building was then completed, but not occupied. The mortgage
was not recorded within sixty days after its apparent date, though it was so on
the day of its actual delivery. The premises being afterwards sold under the
mortgage, it was helR that the mortgagee was entitled, on distribution of the
proceeds of sale, to priority over mechanic's liens for work and materials employed
in the erection of the building, though it was alleged that the holders of these
liens had abstained from bidding at the sale, so as to protect themselves, under
the belief that the date of the mortgage was its true date, and that it had, therefore, lost its lien.
3. Whether in such case, if the mortgage be given to secure a larger amount than
the purchase money, the mortgagee, even though ignorant of this fact, could
claim priority over the mechanic's liens for more than the actual amount of the
purchase money, quwre.

These were appeals from a decree of the District Court of the
city and county of Philadelphia, distributing the proceeds of sale of
a messuage and lot of ground in the city of Philadelphia, under a
writ of levari facias. Both appeals involved the same questions,
and were argued together and decided at the same time.
The facts of the case were as follows :
In the early part of the year 1853, Eli H. Eldridge being then
the owner of the lot of ground in question, agreed verbally to sell it
to one Robert Q. Gibbon for six hundred and fifty dollars, to be
either paid in cash or by Gibbon paying off a mortgage, which
covered both this and an adjoining lot belonging to Eldridge; the
title to be made when these stipulations were complied with. Gibbon took possession at once, and began the erection of a building,
which he planted partly on this lot and partly on an adjoining lot
belonging to his mother, Mary M. Gibbon.
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In the month of October, 1858, a difficulty arose between Eldridge and Gibbon, on account of the latter having failed to pay
the purchase money, which was settled by an agreement that Mrs.
Gibbon should take the title to the lot, and give a mortgage for
the purchase money, which mortgage should be sold, and Eldridge
paid out of the proceeds. In pursuance of this understanding, a
loan was negotiated with Weldon & Tomlinson, but the amount borrowed was made somewhat greater than the actual purchase money,
for the convenience of the vendee. A deed for the messuage and
lot was then made to Mrs. Gibbon, which bore date the 2d of
November, 1853, and recited a consideration of five dollars; and a
mortgage was executed by her to Weldon & Tomlinson, bearing the.
same date, and professing on its face to be for the considerationmoney of the premises. This mortgage was recorded on the 6th of'
January, 1854. The amount secured thereby was eight hundredand fifty dollars.
At the time the conveyance was made to Mrs. Gibbon, the building was subject to certain mechanics' liens for work and materials
done and furnished by the appellants, among others, in and about
its erection and construction, under contracts with Gibbon.
Weldon & Tomlinson subsequently sued out the mortgage, and
the premises were sold at sheriff's sale, and the proceeds referred
to an auditor for distribution. The fund in court proved insufficient
for the discharge of all the liens against the premises, being only
$405 84, and it became necessary, therefore, to determine the
question of priority as between the mortgage and the mechanics'
Hens. Before the auditor, it was asserted as matter of fact, on the
one hand, that the date of the mortgage was not its true date, but
that it had been actually executed within sixty days of ifs record;"
and on the other hand, that Campbell & Pharo, shortly before the
sale, had examined the record of the mortgage, and, being led by
tBy the Pennsylvania act of 28 March, 1820, Bright Dig. 231, it is enacted that
no mortgage shall be a lien until it shall have been recorded or left for record; but
it is thereby provided "that no mortgage given for the purchase money of the land
so mortgaged, shall be affected by the passage of this act, if the same be recorded
iwitkia sixty days from thec execution thereof.".
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the date to suppose that it had lost its lien as a purchase money
mortgage, had abstained from bidding at the sale an amount necessary to protect themselves on the opposite view. In order to determine these facts, issues were directed, which, coming on to be tried
by a jury, a verdict was rendered in the following terms:
, " 1. The jury find that the mortgage was recorded within sixty
days after the execution thereof.
"2. That the said mortgage was executed by Mary H. Gibbon to
Weldon & Tomlinson direct, for the purpose and intention of providifig the purchase money for the premises, to be paid to Eli H.
Eldridge, the vendor, and that he was a party to said arrangement,
-and approved the same.
"3. That one of the plaintiffs, Messrs. Campbell & Pharo, being
lien creditors, did examine the record of the mortgage, and learn
therefrom that the said mortgage appeared to have been recorded
after more than sixty days elapsed, and thereupon and in consequence was deceived as to the priority of the claim, from the date of
the mortgage.
"4. That the equitable estate of R. Q. Gibbon was transferred
to his mother, Mary M. Gibbon, at and about the 1st day of October or 1st of November, 1853."
The matter was thereupon again referred to the auditor, who
reported the facts above stated, and in addition, that the amount of
the purchase money, with interest actually due at the time of the
mortgage, was $636, but that it was represented to Weldon & Tomlinson as a purchase money mortgage, and that they had no notice
that it was for a larger amount than the price of the lot. The
auditor further reported that Weldon & Tomlinson had no notice of
any equitable estate in the lot in Robert Q. Gibbon or in Mary M.
Gibbon, prior to the execution of the deed from Eldridge to the
latter, or of any liens having attached thereto, unless such notice
might be presumed in law from the fact that Robert Q. Gibbon had
erected a building on the lot; and that it did not appear that either
he or his mother had actually used and occupied the building prior
to or at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
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On these facts, the auditor awarded the whole fund to the mortgagees, it being insufficient to satisfy their claim in full, on the
ground of priority of lien, and further decided, that the issue in
relation to Campbell & Pharo having been deceived as to the true
date of the mortgage, was an immaterial one, and the verdict thereon
to be disregarded.
The case coming to be heard, upon exceptions to the auditor's
report, the District Court confirmed the report, and decreed the
fund to the mortgagees.
The opinion of that court was delivered by
HARE, J.-The fund in dispute, arises from the sale of a house and
lot, under a mortgage executed by Mary M. Gibbon, to Weldon &
Tomlinson. The claimants on one side are the mortgagees, who have
an undisputed legal title, founded on a conveyance made by Eli H.
Eldridge to the mortgagor, on the day that the mortgage was executed; and on the other, certain lien creditors, by whom the house was
erected, under contracts made prior to the conveyance, with one R.
Q. Gibbon, at a time when the latter had nothing in the land but
an equitable interest, arising under oral contract of sale made with
Eldridge, from whom both sides deduce their title. The act of
April 28th, 1840, expressly restricts the operation of liens, filed
for work done or materials furnished for the erection or construction
of buildings, to the estate of the person in possession of the land at
the time, or at whose instance the same is erected; but the lien
creditors seek to escape from its operation on the ground, that as
R. Q. Gibbon transferred his estate to Mary M. Gibbon before she
acquired the legal title, it merged in her prior equitable interest,
and thus became subject to all encumbrances which were binding
on the latter.
Properly speaking, merger cannot be predicated of the union
of a legal and equitable right to the same land, for when the legal
and equitable titles unite, the former ordinarily becomes superfluous, and will only survive when and so far as its distinct existence
may be necessary to subserve those purposes for which it was originally recognized or created. Preston on Merger, 82T-341. For
when such a union occurs, equity yields to and follows the law,
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unless there are special circumstances of notice, or of payment of
value on one side,.and want of it on the other, which make it inequitable that the law should prevail; qoodright vs. Wells, Douglas,
871; 3 Vesey 839; Wade vs. -Paget,1 Brown Ch. 868; -Philips
vs. Brydges, 3 Yesey,'126; Preston on Merger, 815; James vs.
Horey, 2 Cowen, 246, 259, 318, 818; Doton vs. tussell, 7 Cowen,
147. Thus the equitable estate will not be kept alive in favor of
heirs cx.parte materna, for the purpose of preventing those on the
paternal side from taking the land by virtue of their superior right
to the legal title; (Goodrightvs. Wells) because both are mere volunteers, and one can show no better equity than the other. Hence, in
order to postpone the mortgagees who have the legal title, to the
lien creditors, whose claims attached to the equity before both estates
united, it must appear that the position of things is such as to require
the intervention of chancery, in favor of the one and against the
other. Had the land remained in the hands of Mary M. Gibbon,
the estate which she derived from her son would have been unquestionably chargeable with liens of which she had full notice, and
could not have been freed from them, by the subsequent conveyance
made to her by Eldridge ; .Ritchter vs. Selin, 8 S. & R. 425. But
the execution of the mortgage to Weldon & Tomlinson, introduced
a new element into the transaction, by giving birth to the rights,
which belong to purchasers for value, and rendering the contest one
between the holders of an undisputed legal title, deduced regularly
of record, and claimants whose right rises no higher than an unrecorded equity on the other.
This statement of the question is sufficient to show, that the title
of the mortgagees must prevail, unless they had notice of the equity
at or before the period at which the mortgage was executed; for
nothing is better settled, than that equity, far from disturbing a
6onafide purchaser, will assist him in maintaining those rights against
all comers, which he has acquired in good faith, and may consequently retain with a safe conscience. This is emphatically true, in
cases like the present, where the estate of the purchaser is fortified
by the record, while that of those who assail it, depends wholly on
transactions in pais, and evidenced by parol, and thus enables him
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to rely on the wise and salutary enactments, which require that the
title to land shall be duly recorded, for the protection of buyers,
and to give simplicity and safety to the transfer of real estate. The
value of these statutes to the whole community is immense, and no
man should be deprived of his share in the benefit, without sufficient
proof that he has forfeited his claim to protection, by buying with
notice derived from private sources, of that which he could not learn
through the more appropiate means of the public offices of the proper
county.
Notice, though sometimes a mixed question of law and fact, is
always, when the facts are proved or undisputed, a question of law;
and the question whether the mortgagees had notice is set at rest by
the report of the auditor, who finds " that Weldon and Tomlinson
had no notice of any equitable estate in the said lot in Robert Q.
Gibbon or in Mary I. Gibbon, prior to the execution of the deed
from Eldridge to Mary Al. Gibbon, nor of any lien having attached
on the same, unless such notice may be presumed in law from the
fact of Robert Q. Gibbon's having erected a building on the said lot."
And he goes on to add, that " it does not appear that either Robert
Q. Gibbon or Mary M. Gibbon ever actually used or occupied the
lot prior to or at the time of the execution of the mortgage."
As the report of an auditor is conclusive on all matters of fact,
unless the circumstances thus found show notice, we are bound
to presume that it was not given, and it would seem plain, that
no such construction can be put upon them. The only conclusion,
which can be fairly deduced from the existence of a newly built
house, on land offereed for sale, or comprised in a deed or conveyance, is that it may be subject to liens, which may bind the
estate of the vendor: it has no tendency to show that the equitable interest has been severed from the legal, and is outstanding in
the hands of other persons. The proper mode of ascertaining
whether such liens exist is the judgment index under the name of the
owner as the record shows him; and if a search duly made there
negatives their existence, it need not be prosecuted elsewhere,
because there is no mode in which it can be prosecuted effectually.
Common sense has long since established that nothing can be
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effectual as notice which will not, if followed up, end in knowledge.
Hence no better criterion can be given, for determining whether
the title of a purchaser should be made to yield to antecedent
equities, than an inquiry whether he had the means of discovering
their existence, and whether the purchase was one which he would
have been taught to avoid, by a competent knowledge of the law,
and the exercise of due diligence in discovering the facts, in subordination to the usual course of business.
In the present instance, the best and most careful legal adviser
would have limited his inquiries to the title of Eldridge, as set forth
of record, down to the conveyance to Mary M. Gibbon, and would
have rested content in the belief, that as it was wholly unexceptionable when it came from his hands to hers and was mortgaged
by her immediately upon the receipt of the deed from him, the
mortgagees might advance their money in safety on the faith of the
record. The possession of the property was, so far as appears,
consistent with the record, for the building would seem to have been
*wholly vacant, at the period when the title passed from Eldridge to
Mary M. Gibbon, and vested under her mortgage in Weldon and
Tomlinson. To make possession notice, its nature and existence
must be proved and not left to presumption.
Had R. Q. Gibbon been actually engaged in erecting the building when the mortgage was executed, a question might have arisen,
whether the mortgagees were not bound to take notice, that he was
acting under a contract of sale, and not merely as a builder or contractor; although an equivocal or doubtful possession can never be
held to operate as notice without the risk of doing the most flagrant
injustice. But the house was finished and his possession at an end
some time before the conveyance by Eldridge, which is the source of
the plaintiff's title, who could only infer from seeing a new building
on the premises, and finding no liens outstanding against the holder
of the record title, that he had erected the building and paid for it.
It may indeed be said that an inquiry of Mary M. Gibbon or Eldridge, would have revealed the truth; but this necessarily involves
the asumption that the truth would have been spoken had such an
inquiry been made. Were purchasers bound to quit the safe guid-
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ance of the record for the purpose of prosecuting inquiries elsewhere,
and presumed to have -known that which others might or would have
told them, there would be no reason for stopping short of the presumption that they knew everything which was or might have been
known to the vendor; which would render the purchase of real
estate one of those dangers which wise men would encounter as
seldom as possible. In every point of view, therefore, the title of
the mortgagees should be held free from equities growing out of
antecedent transactions to which they were strangers at the time,
and which so far as we know, were never disclosed to them subsequently, and we consequently dismiss the exceptions to the auditor's report, which are all founded on a different and opposite view
of the law.
I have said nothing hitherto of the case of Foster's Appeal, 3 Barr,
79, in which a judgment against a prior equitable interest, arising
out of a contract of sale, was held not only to bind the legal title on
its subsequent acquisition by the vendee, but to follow it into the
hands of a subsequent mortgagee, who was not shown to have had
notice of the existence of the equity; chiefly as it would seem, because the mortgage was not recorded within the period fixed by the
recording acts. But it is so clear that a purchaser, who traces the
title to land from its source down to the moment when he takes his
deed, without finding anything on the records of the county to warn
him that there is aught to impede the course of the stream, cannot
be deprived of the benefit of his purchase, -without proof that he
received that information from other quarters which he could not
find in the manner provided by law, that we are compelled to presume either that notice was proved or conceded at the trial, and
omitted in the report, or, what seems more likely, that the necessity
for notice was overlooked by the counsel in the cause, and the question whether it was necessary not raised or argued before the court.
It is very plain that the judgment itself did not operate as notice,
for no man is bound to continue the search for judgments farther
back than the record shows the title to have been in the hands of
him against whom the search is made, nor could any effect have
been due to the possession of the vendor antecedently to the period
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at which -hereceived his deed, because it is enough that possession
be consistent with the title at the time when it is conveyed, and it
would be at once dangerous and useless to require an examination
into the nature or character of prior possessions.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has repeatedly held that
the true way to view questions arising between legal and equitable
rights or titles, is to suppose a bill filed by th ose who claim the
equity against those who hold by virtue of the law. Had this course
been taken in Foster's Appeal, it would have been seen that although
the judgment creditor had a better right to the legal title than the
vendee, and might consequently subject it to an execution, which
would have bound both the law ana the equity; yet that this right
was liable to be defeated by a bona fide sale or mortgage, without
notice of the equity, and that the failure of the purchaser to record
his deed or mortgage could not subject him to the lien of the prior
judgment, although it might have been fatal had a sale been made
to a purchaser without notice under the judgment. It is true, that
the lien of a mortgage dates from its record, but this is only true
as between incumbrances binding the same right or title; and it
cannot be supposed that a failure to record a mortgage of the legal
title will postpone it to a prior or subsequent mortgage of an
equity which is undisclosed at the time when the legal title is mortgaged. But if this were not so, still the worst which can result
from delay in recording a mortgage under any circumstances, is to
shut it out from all prior operation, and make it take effect as if it
had been executed and delivered on the day that it is recorded.
Hence, a mortgagee can never be prejudiced by his want of diligence in putting the mortgage on record, unless the estate of the
mortgagor undergoes some alteration in the interval of such a nature
as to render a new mortgage ineffectual. In Foster's appeal, and
in the case now before us, no change occurred of any description,
and a conveyance to a purchaser would have passed precisely the
same title, when the mortgage was recorded, as when it was originally executed.
There still remains another view of the question, which I mention
because it had much weight with the court, and would seem to be

CAMPBELL AND PHARO'S APPEAL.

conclusive, in connection with the reasons already stated. At all
times, and under any possible view of the law, the claim of the lien
creditors was subject to the legal estate of Eldridge, and consequently
to his right to the purchase money, for which it remained in his
hands as a security. Had, therefore, all the facts been known, and
the fullest notice given, Eldridge might have mortgaged the title
thus held to Weldon & Tomlinson, to the extent of the value for
which he held it, nor would such a step on his part have curtailed
or in any way prejudiced those claiming the equity.
And it would seem sufficiently plain, that if this could be done
by a direct transfer, it might equally be effected through the medium
of a conveyance to Mary M. Gibbon, and an immediate assignment
by her to Weldon & Tomlinson, who would thus only acquire what
the lien creditors had no right to have, and what the other parties
to the transaction might consequently part with. Such a conveyance and assignment were made in the present instance, and the
jury to whom the question was submitted have found that the whole
was one transaction.
It has already been shown that an equity will disappear in the
legal title, unless the intention of the holder or the exigencies of
justice interpose and thus keep it separate. Here the requirements
of justice and the meaning of the parties both require that the
holders of the legal title, and those claiming under them, should
have that priority, to the extent of the unpaid purchase money,
which its retention at the time of the sale conferred on the vendor,
and which creditors claiming under the vendee, and acting solely on
the faith of his imperfect estate, have no right to dispute. Hence,
as the fund in court falls short of the price of the land, there can be
no doubt as to the proper mode of application. In every point of
view, therefore, we think that no equity has been shown of a nature
to control the use now made of the legal title, and we consequently
award the fund to the mortgagees, to whom it was transferred by
the mortgage.
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From this decree Campbell & Pharo, and John H. Siner & Co.,
claimants, upon mechanics' liens, respectively appealed.
Briggs, for the appellants.
The fund here should have been awarded to the lien creditors, in
preference to the mortgagees. The taking possession of the lot by
Gibbon, and his making improvements thereon, put in him an unquestionable equitable estate: Pugh&
vs; Good, 3 Watts & S. 56;
Lee vs. Lee, 9 Barr, 169; Reed vs. Reed, 2 Jones, 117; Moore
vs. Small, 7 Harris, 461; which was subject to the liens. Thomas
vs. Simpson, 3 Barr, 69; Biche vs. Lelia, 8 S. & R. 425; 12 Id.
12; 3 Binn. 4. This estate so encumbered was transferred to
Mary H. Gibbon, and when the legal and equitable title became
vested in her, the liens instantly attached to the legal estate.
Lynch vs. Dearth, 2 Penn. R. 101; Foster's Appeal, 3 Barr, 79;
Lynn vs. efGuffey, 4 Barr, 128; Watts vs. Steel, 1 Binn. 386.
The case of Cickering vs. Lovejoy, 13 Mass. 51, relied upon on
the other side, does not apply, for no interest was ever in the party
who is supposed to occupy there the position of Mrs. Gibbon here.
In this case, the conveyance to her, by the vendor, and the mortgage by her to a stranger, constituted two separate transactions.
She had a clear and distinct interest, and the dealing of the mortgagee was with that, as is shown by the fact that the mortgage was
for considerably more than the price of the land. Eldridge might,
indeed, have assigned his title to the mortgagees, but that was not
done or intended to be done.
This cannot be, as was assumed below, a purchase money mortgage, for that involves the reservation of an interest in the land
conveyed by the vendor. Here Weldon & Tomlinson had no previous title to or interest in the land. Nor was it a continuation of
the vendor's lien, for there was no express assignment of that; and
such a lien cannot subsist after the execution .of the deed. But
even if it can be considered as a purchase money mortgage, it has
lost its priority by not having been recorded within sixty days, as
required by the Act of 1820. Brightly, Purd. 231, sec. 83.
Foster's Appeal, 3 Barr, 79, is an express decision on this point.
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It is true that it is found by the auditor that the mortgage was
recorded in sixty days from its actual execution; but as regards
strangers, the date of the deed must be taken as conclusive, otherwise the record would tend rather to mislead than enlighten. Here
the verdict of the jury establishes that Campbell & Pharo were
actually deceived into a change of their position, by this false
date. Hence the mortgagees are equitably estopped from contradicting the record on this point. Comm. vs. Molts, 10 Barr, 530;
-Pickardvs. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469, 1 Greenleaf Ev. § 207.
Upon the question of notice, Gibbon was in possession at the
time of the execution of the mortgage, and this was notice of the
equitatle estate. The building was a new one, and that was sufficient to have put the mortgagees upon inquiry as to liens. The
appellants were in no default on their part, for they filed their
claims within the proper time, and against the proper building and
the proper parties.
Cuyler, contra.
The appellees have the superior equity. They claim on a mortgage created at the instant the title was conveyed, which represents
the unpaid purchase money. The liens were only on an equitable
estate, which was subject to this very purchase money, and of which
the mortgagees had no knowledge or means of knowledge. The
building was unoccupied, and the possession therefore consistent
with the record title. The Act of 1840 (Brightly Dig. 581) expressly provides that a mechanic's lien "shall not extend to any
other or greater estate in the ground on which any building 'may be
erected, than that of the person or persons in possession at the time
of commencing the said building, and at whose instance the same is
erected." True, it is held under this act that a lien in an equitable
estate attaches itself to the subsequently acquired legal estate, as a
judgment does. .jon vs. Mc Guffey, 4 Barr, 126. But here the
legal estate was acquired by a purchaser without notice, who may
in conscience retain it, and thus prevent a merger. The lien
creditors have no peculiar equity; they furnished their materials on
the faith of the equitable estate only, and that was subject to the
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the payment of this purchase money. Why should the court assist
them to get that which was no part of their security? Eldridge
could have mortgaged directly to the appellees, to the extent of the
unpaid purchase money, and in so doing would have worked no
prejudice to the holder of the equitable estate. What difference can
there be if he convey, and the grantee mortgages? Lynch vs.
Dearth is not in point here, because there the deed and mortgage
were not executed under the same contract; and Chickering vs.
Lovejoy, 13 Mass. 51, Holbrook vs. Finney, 4 Id. 569, were there
distinguished on that very ground, which they possess in common
with the present. Love vs. Jones, 4 Watts & Serg. 465, is a
strong authority in our favor; and this case, as well as Lyon vs.
Afe uffey, show that where the delivery of the deed and the creation of the circumstance are parts of one and the same transaction,
the law does not give priority to charges of earlier date, obtained
against the equitable estate.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEwis,
work and
ble estate
nor legal

C. J.-The mechanics and material men furnished their
materials, in this case, entirely on the credit of the equitathen in Robert Q. Gibbon. They had neither an equitable
right to anything beyond that estate, and they were as

much bound to stand aside in favor of the vendor's claim for the
purchase money, supported as it was by the legal estate, as Gibbon
imself was.
But it is supposed by their counsel, that there was a door left
open by means of which they might enter upon the legal estate,
after it was conveyed to Mary M. Gibbon, and before she executed
the mortgag6 for the purchase money. But, unfortunately for
their enterprise, there was no interval of time between the delivery
of the deed and the mortgage. They were executed at the same
time, and are to be taken as a single transaction. It is true that
the deed came from Eldridge to Mary M. Gibbon, and the mortgage
was from Mary M. Gibbon to Weldon & Tomlinson.
But the
mortgage was given to provide for the purchase money, under an
arrangement made by the mortgagor, the vendor and the mort-
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gagees. The material circumstance in the case is, that the money
was advanced by Weldon & Tomlinson, on the faith of this arrangement, and under a representation that the mortgage was for the
purchase money. The whole transaction shows that there was no
intention whatever to permit Mary M. Gibbon to acquire the legal
estate for an instant discharge of the purchase money, and the acts
of the parties show that they carried out their intention.
It is true that the mortgage is not valid against the mechanic's
liens, for anything more than the purchase money; but the proceeds in court will not satisfy even that amount.
'Where mechanics' liens are entered against an equitable estate,
their value depends upon that estate, and they survive or perish
with it. When that estate is founded upon a contract of purchase,
every partial payment increases the security of the liens. Even if
the money be borrowed for the purpose, the lender gains no priority
over the prior liens cn the equitable estate, unless he advanced his
money upon a contract with the holder of the legal estate, and on
the security of that estate. Zynch v. Dearth, 2 P. Rep. 101, was
the case of money loaned without any contract with the holder of
the legal estate. In that case, the prior liens were preferred to a
mortgage given for the money borrowed to pay the vendor. Lyon
vs.. 11c Guffey, 4 Barr, 126, was a case where there was an interval
of seventeen days between the conveyance of the legal estate and
the entry of judgment for the purchase money. After such a long
interval it ivas impossible to say that the delivery of the deed and
the entry of the judgment were one transaction, and if followed that
the liens on the equitable estate gained a priority over the judgment
for the purchase money.
The case now before us differs from both the cases cited. It differs from the last in the material circumstance that the delivery of
the deed and the execution of the mortgage took place at the same
time, and were one transaction. It differs from the first in the still
more. important particular, that the noney was not advanced on
the credit of the equitable estate at all, but distinctly upon the
security of a mortgage upon the legal estate, for the purchase
money, under a contract with the vendor himself. The deed was

